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1. Preliminary observations
Pages 88 f. from Franz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 
(1874) are the classical locus of current theories of intentionality.1 It is here 
that Brentano reintroduces the problem of intentionality into contempora-
ry philosophy, by saying that “every mental phenomenon is characterized 
by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called die intentionale (auch wohl 
mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegendstandes, (the intentional (or mental) inexi-
stence of an object),” or what he “might call […] die Richtung auf ein Ob-
jekt (the direction towards an object),” and “die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt”, 
which I translate “relation to a content” and consider synonymous with 
the expression “intentional relation”2 (Brentano (1995a), 88 f.). In what fol-
lows I propose an interpretation of intentionality in Brentano according 
to which the intentionality passage (IP), cited above, can be read through 
the lens of two different theories; I then claim that one of these theories 
performs a very important task in his 1874 work. 
Before I present this thesis, I wish to make the following observation: 
one of the fundamental presuppositions of this study is the idea that the 
object to which the mental act is related in the first instance is the imma-
nent object (Ebd., 180, 197 f.; Brentano (1995b), 139). As a result, in full 
agreement with Brentano, when I discuss the relation to or the direction 
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towards an object, I shall first consider this immanent object, and only later 
approach the relationship between the mental act and its immanent object, 
on the one hand, and the extra-mental object presented by the immanent 
object, on the other. 
This basic idea can also be expressed in the following way: the theory 
of intentionality as presented in the IP is not primarily a theory of the way 
in which mental acts, together with their immanent objects, are related to 
the extra-mental objects presented by them. It is, rather, first of all a theory 
about the most salient distinguishing feature separating mental phenomena from 
physical phenomena. For Brentano, the clarification of this aspect play an 
important role in the establishment of psychology as an empirical science, 
because it thus allows (i) the delimitation of the latter’s research domain, the 
world of mental phenomena, from the research domain of natural sciences, 
the world of physical phenomena; and (ii) the creation of a framework 
for ordering and classifying mental phenomena into their three fundamen-
tal classes: presentations, judgements, and emotional phenomena. As will 
be shown, the form of the relation to the immanent object does not only 
constitute the fundamental criterion for delimiting the mental from the 
physical, but also serves to delimit the main classes of mental phenomena3 
(Brentano (1995a), 44, 50 f., 88 f., 98 ff., 197 f.).
This allows us to distinguish between two theories of intentionality: (i) 
the theory of intentionality as a conception of the most salient distinctive fea-
ture of the mental with respect to the physical (IT1); and (ii) the theory of inten-
tionality as a way of relating mental acts to the extra-mental objects presented 
by immanent objects, be they sensible or abstract, existent or non-existent 
(IT2).4 In this context, one of the central theses of this study is the follow-
ing: although the account of intentionality in the 1874 work can be valo-
rised from the perspective of both theories, it still fundamentally constitutes 
an example of IT1. This, however, does not mean that the IT1 under discus-
sion cannot be valorised from the perspective of IT2. By contrast, in what 
follows I shall put forward arguments in favour of the idea that the 1874 
IT1 contains certain elements the clarification and development of which 
could constitute an example of IT2, namely the fact that the immanent ob-
ject is permanently conceived of by Brentano as presenting an extra-mental 
object. In 1874 Brentano does not elaborate the IT2 involved in his empi-
rical psychology, and when he really questions himself regarding the pro-
blem of the object to which, in the last instance, psychical acts are related, 
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after 1904 he offers a solution that entirely eliminates immanent objects as 
objects of primary relation of psychical acts.5 Despite these points, I shall 
defend in what follows the thesis that in the IT1 of his 1874 work, a clear 
distinction is made, at the level of the act of sensation, between the content 
of the presentation and the extra-mental object presented by it.
The main elements of IT1 are the mental act, with its relation to or di-
rection towards a content (immanent object) proprietary to it, on the one 
hand, and the immanent object or the content, on the other. If we interpret 
this last object as being in agreement with the topic of this study, namely 
as an immanent object of the mental act of sensation and thus as a physical 
phenomenon, then, on the basis of what is said in the 1874 work, two per-
spectives for approaching a physical phenomenon can be discerned: (i) its 
correlation to a mental act that contains it; and (ii) its correlation to the 
extra-mental object or its physical cause, the sign of which it is (Brentano 
(1995a), 9 f., 19, 88 f.). It follows that one can talk about the double status 
of a physical phenomenon in the Psychology of 1874, namely the physical 
phenomenon (i) as the content of sensation and (ii) as the sign of a physical 
cause whose action on the sense organs gives rise to the presence of the phe-
nomenon in question in consciousness. This last aspect also indicates how 
one can go from IT1 to IT2, because conceiving of the content of sensation 
as a sign points, from the beginning, to the extra-mental object for which 
it stands, namely its physical cause. From my point of view, this fact has 
two-fold significance: (i) it shows that in the 1874 work the distinction be-
tween the immanent object and the extra-mental object presented through 
the immanent object is achieved at the level of the act of sensation; and (ii) 
it shows that the act of sensation is connected not only to the physical phe-
nomenon it contains, but also to the extra-mental object or physical cause 
to which this phenomenon refers. The clarification of this last relationship 
can thus lead us from IT1 to IT2. However, as we have seen, the estab-
lishment of psychology as a science presupposed for Brentano, in 1874, a 
clear delimitation of the features of mental phenomena from the features 
of physical phenomena contained by the former. But in this delimitation a 
clear distinction between the content of sensation and its cause is entailed.
The above points show that the presupposition of this study, namely 
that mental acts are oriented, at a basic level of analysis, towards their im-
manent objects, has a strictly methodological nature: the desire to establish 
psychology as an empirical science through the separation of the mental 
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from the physical led Brentano to orient himself towards the specific fea-
tures of the two classes of phenomena, both present in consciousness.6 In 
this context, Brentano clearly recognizes that a physical phenomenon is 
a sign of the physical cause to which it points and that is presented by it 
(Ebd., 9). Furthermore, he does this without valorising this relation from 
the perspective of a theory of the distinction between the content and the 
extra-mental objects of a presentation.7 
Although I shall occasionally refer to IT2, this study will be concerned 
in the main with the essential aspects of IT1. It will be helpful to note some 
key expressions of the language of Brentanian IT1, which are as follows: 
“the intentional (or maybe mental) inexistence of an object,” “the immanent 
objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit),” “to exist as an object (objectively) in some-
thing,” “to exist immanently as an object,” the object is “present (gegenwär-
tig)” in the mind, “the mental phenomena contain an object intentionally 
within themselves,” “the relation (die Beziehung) to a content,” and “the re-
lation to the immanent object” (Brentano (1995a), 81, 88 f. 197 f.). 
Unlike these expressions, which clearly support IT1, in the 1874 work 
there are comparatively few expressions as clearly in favour of IT2. Rather, 
expressions that can be cited in its support are ambiguous, not least be-
cause they can be interpreted as just as easily supporting IT1; such as: “the 
rela tion to an object (die Beziehung auf ein Objekt)”, the “direction towards 
an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing)” (Ebd., 
VII, 88) and the phrases formed with the verb “to appear” used in such ex-
pressions: “[…] something appears in consciousness […]” or “We speak of a 
presentation whenever something appears to us” (Ebd., 81, 198). Paraphra-
sing Twardowski,8 we can say that in this last case the term “something” 
nicely indicates the ambiguity of the term “object” in Brentano’s Psychology, 
be cause it can be understood either as what appears to consciousness as 
a content of the presentation, or as what appears to consciousness as an 
extra-mental object presented through the content of the presentation. The 
distinction between the pictorial image (a photograph or a painting) of the 
Salzburg Cathedral and the real Salzburg Cathedral, for example, illustrates 
this distinction. As we can see, within this last interpretation such expres-
sions point to something outside consciousness, outside the act-immanent 
object correlation, because they introduce the problem of the relation be-
tween the immanent object of the act and the extra-mental object presented 
through it. The same problem is also raised by the relative clause: “… (which 
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is not to be understood here as meaning a thing)”, because it suggests that 
the object towards which the psychical act is directed is not necessarily real, 
and thus it points to the relation between the immanent object and the 
object presented through it, which is central for IT2. For our present pur-
poses, we should exclude, from the beginning, the possibility that for Bren-
tano psychical acts directly relate to extra-mental objects without the help 
of content. I interpret the relative clause under discussion as meaning that 
the immanent objects towards which acts are oriented do not only present 
real things, but can just as well present unreal things; for instance imagina-
ry beings.9 The above-mentioned relative clause does not present the pro-
blem of the relation between an act and its immanent object, but rather the 
problem of the status of an immanent object and of the relation between it 
and the object presented through it; this shows, on the one hand, that IT2 
is implicitly contained in IT1 and, on the other, that the expression in ques-
tion finds its place in the language of IT2, instead of that of IT1. However, 
if we interpret this as being in agreement with our starting point, namely 
that of the relation to or the direction towards the immanent object, then 
the expression of which the relative clause is part takes the following form: 
“direction towards an [immanent] object (which is not to be understood 
here as meaning a thing).” 
In the last section I shall present supplementary arguments in favour of 
the hypothesis according to which IT2 is a clarification and development of 
IT1. For this purpose, I shall refer to a text from the logic lectures (EL80), 
given by Brentano five years before the publication of Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint, in which he approaches, this time explicitly, the re-
lationship between the act and both its immanent object and the object 
presented through this object. 
Before approaching these problems, I wish, however, to make an obser-
vation about the perspective I take in what follows. This paper was motiva-
ted by an interest in the historical sources of Brentano’s thinking. For this 
reason I start by examining the role his conception of intentionality plays 
in the program of his empirical psychology, namely the separation of the realm 
of the psychical from the realm of the physical and of the main classes of 
psychical phenomena. This approach differs considerably from the way in 
which Brentano is read by many contemporary scholars, who seem to me 
to be preoccupied with the problem of intentionality from the perspective 
of contemporary philosophy of mind. The aims of this paper are not, there-
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fore, aligned with those of the contemporary mainstream, but to respect the 
program of Brentano’s psychology.
2. The theory of intentionality from 1874 is not primarily a theory of 
the relation between an act, its content, and the extra-mental object, but 
a theory about what separates the mental realm from the physical realm
In what follows, I shall put forward arguments in support of the idea that 
the theory of intentionality from 1874 is primarily a theory of the distinction 
between psychical and physical phenomena. This theory can be valorised from 
the perspective of IT2, but its purpose is not to clarify the relation between 
the contents of consciousness and the extra-mental objects to which they 
refer. Rather its purpose is to circumscribe the field of research of psychology in 
relation to the domain of natural sciences. Thus, we touch upon another mo-
dern aspect of Brentano’s psychology that has been more or less neglected 
by existing exegesis, and which connects intentionality with the program 
of the Psychology of 1874. 
A letter addressed to Anton Marty, the inaugural lecture from the Uni-
versity of Vienna, On the reasons for the discouragement in the philosophical 
field (Über die Gründe der Entmutigung auf philosophischem Gebiete), and the 
work from 1874 indicate that during this period Brentano paid great at-
tention to Auguste Comte’s program for the “positivation” of science.10 In 
agreement with this project, Brentano thinks that the sciences of nature 
can serve as a model for the edification of the sciences of the mental, due 
to the success they were enjoying in the modern age. For this reason he 
operates, in the book of 1874, with a definition of science that is applicable 
both to psychology and to the sciences of nature: science as an investigation 
of particularities, and also of the laws of succession and the co-existence of 
physical and mental phenomena (Brentano (1995a), 10 f., 18 f., 44 f.).
Another important idea to which Brentano pays special attention is 
Comte’s classification of the sciences. As is well known, Comte grounds 
this classification in the thesis that there is an order in phenomena – this 
starts with the simplest phenomena, studied by mathematics, and, in creases 
in complexity, finally reaching the social phenomena. Based on this idea, 
Comte advances a classification of the sciences according to which mathe-
matics occupies the first position. In accordance with the order of phenome-
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na, mathematics is followed by astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, 
and social physics.11 It is interesting to note that for Comte, psychology be-
longed to the metaphysical stage of the spirit, and for this reason he replaces 
it, within the field of physiology, with the positive  science of phrenology.12 
Brentano then assumes this scheme, but subjects it to significant change by 
introducing psychology where Comte located sociology. Brentano classifies 
the sciences as follows: mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology, and 
psychology (Brentano (1995a), 23 f.). Like Comte, he emphasises that each 
class of phenomena specific to a science is built on the anterior class, and 
it makes possible the next. But unlike Comte, he identifies a ‘cut’ in the 
classification of the sciences, since for him only the phenomena of phy-
sics, chemistry, and physiology can be considered developments on those 
of the preceding classes. However, the mental phenomena appear to be 
something completely different: 
But the result of a more careful comparison and an analysis of all perti-
nent facts certainly seems to us to prove that much more information about 
physiological phenomena is to be expected from chemical phenomena than 
from physiological phenomena about mental phenomena. The difference 
between physiological processes and chemical and physical processes really 
seems to be only that physiological processes are more complex. […] We 
can hardly say the same thing of the concept of life when we apply it to 
the physiological and psychical realms. On the contrary, if we turn our at-
tention from the external world to the inner, we find ourselves, as it were, 
in a new realm. The phenomena are absolutely heterogeneous, and even 
analogies either forsake us completely or take on a very vague and artificial 
character. It was for this very reason that we separated the psychical and 
physical sciences as the main branches of empirical science in our earlier 
discussion of the fundamental divisions of that realm. (Ebd., 50 f.) 
If we supplement this quote with what Brentano says at the beginning of 
the second book of his Psychology, namely that “all the data of our con-
sciousness are divided into two great classes – the class of physical and the 
class of mental phenomena” (Ebd., 77), and with the statement that “the fea-
ture which best characterizes mental phenomena is undoubtedly their in-
tentional inexistence” (Ebd., 98), we are lead in a wholly different direction 
– no longer that of a theory of relating mental acts to the extra-mental ob-
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jects presented by immanent objects. Here we find that intentionality is the 
most pregnant feature distinguishing the mental from the physical realm, 
broadly understood as the realm of physical, chemical, and physiological 
phenomena. The fact that physical phenomena are conceived of as contents 
of psychological acts of sensation (Ebd., 98 ff.) allows us to establish the 
distinctive notes separating the two fields, and on this basis to distinguish 
two classes of phenomena, both existing in consciousness. The distinction, 
fundamental for IT2, between the content of consciousness – be it a physi-
cal phenomenon or a signification – and the extra-mental object for which 
it stands, is not explicitly taken into account here. It is implied, however, in 
the way in which Brentano conceives of physical phenomena. 
If we want to consider what Brentano states in the IP from the point 
of view of IT2, then it must be acknowledged that this quote reveals only 
an incomplete and fragmentary view of such a theory. Approaching it from 
this latter point of view, we might say that only those elements of IT2 that 
can serve the purpose of distinguishing the mental from the physical  realm 
– namely the mental act and its phenomenal content – are highlighted here. 
The manner in which the mental relates to the extra-mental world of phy-
sical causes is not explicitly accounted for. As mentioned at the start of 
this paper, this should not make it impossible to reconstruct the coordi-
nates of the version of IT2 in the work of 1874, i.e., the coordinates of the 
theory that explains how the mental act and its immanent object refer to the 
extra-mental object. By contrast, the fact that Brentano conceives of physical 
phenomena not only as phenomenal contents of the act of sensation, but 
also as signs of the action of a physical cause upon the sense organs, offers 
sufficient elements for a reconstruction of the coordinates of IT2, at least at 
the level of the act of sensation. Nevertheless, the quote about intentionality 
was not written for this purpose, but first and foremost in order to emphasize the 
most salient distinguishing features of the psychical in contrast to the physical.
I shall now put forward arguments in support of this idea, starting with 
the following considerations:
Twardowski published On the Content and Object of Presentations in 
1894. In this work, he takes over an idea from Höfler’s Logic, written to-
gether with Meinong, and with this intends to confront the ambiguity of 
the term “object” in Brentano’s psychology. To do this, he distinguishes 
between: (i) the presented object as a content of the act or as an immanent 
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object, and (ii) the presented object as an object present to consciousness 
through the immanent object (Twardowski (1894), 1 f., 8–17).
 Twardowski’s distinction refers to a real problem with Brentanian psy-
chology, namely to the fact that Brentano does not explicitly explain the 
relation between the mental act, its immanent object, and the object presen-
ted by the immanent object. Furthermore, Brentano is not trying, in 1874, 
to highlight the differences between the manner in which the distinction 
act–immanent object–object presented by the immanent object works in 
relation to sensorial and nominal presentations. From my point of view, the 
goal of classification that underlies this investigation into the distinction 
between mental and physical phenomena decisively supports the approach 
presented in the 1874 work. At the same time, it does not encourage other 
research perspectives, for example, the explicit approach that is implied by 
an IT2, i.e., clarification of the relation between the act, the immanent ob-
ject, and the extra-mental object. To put it in another way, the decisive 
question of the 1874 work is: what distinguishes a mental from a physical 
phenomenon – and not how does a mental phenomenon and its content 
relate to the extra-mental world? The two questions are distinct and should 
not be confused, for they belong to different research horizons and are dri-
ven by different interests.
As we have seen, the question regarding the distinction between the 
two classes of phenomena by no means excludes, but rather implies the 
question of how the mental phenomena that we call sensations relate to 
the world of physical causes. In other words, it implies a distinction be-
tween the immanent object (phenomenal content or physical phenomenon) 
and the object presented through this content at the level of sensation. In 
order make this clear, I would like to point out that Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint offers a clear and indubitable, modern answer to the 
above-mentioned question. According to the explanation it offers, which is 
consistent with the physiology of its time, a firm line must be drawn between 
the physical phenomenon, that is, the immanent object of sensation constituted 
by the primary and secondary qualities of modern philosophy (perceived spa-
tial forms, but also the seen colour, the smelled odour, etc.), and the physi-
cal  cause that produced it and which is symbolised by it (Brentano (1995a), 19, 
98 ff.). This physical cause consists in processes of molecular vibration, 
impact, and pressure triggered by physical bodies, and vibrations that act 
on the sensory receptors, stimulate the afferent nerves, and produce certain 
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sensations – the seen colour, the felt warmth, etc. (Ebd., 47). These sensory 
qualities exist as such only in consciousness; they “have only a phenomenal 
and intentional existence” (Ebd., 92), as Brentano states, and any attempt to 
think about them as real properties of things leads to contradictory results 
(Ebd., 93 f.). Sensory qualities are, for this reason, signs of their causes or 
of their physical forces, and not an accurate image of those causes. But their 
nature as signs and, more generally, the often repeated Brentanian thesis 
about the falsity of external perception that considers sensorial qualities to 
be real, constitutes no obstacle for the modern science of nature.
On the basis of Brentano’s remarks about Comte, one could say that the 
main focus of the science of nature is not that of searching beyond physical 
phenomena in order to see whether or not they exist in reality, but of assum-
ing from the very beginning their phenomenal status.13 In this framework, 
the science of nature does not purport to discover the absolute structure of 
the physical world, but contents itself with attributing to that world certain 
forces, for which it establishes the laws of succession and co-existence.14 
These laws at the same time govern the succession and co-existence of the 
physical phenomena produced by the action of these forces on the sense 
organs. Looking at things from the perspective of such phenomena, one 
could say that the discourse on phenomena, regarding the laws according to 
which they co-exist and succeed one another, is simultaneously a discourse 
on the forces that produce these phenomena, and about the laws governing 
them. In other words, according to Brentano, we can be talking about phy-
sical phenomena but actually mean their causes (Brentano (1995a), 98 ff.). 
Placed in the terms of the act−content−object (presented by the content) 
distinction, central to IT2, this idea can be expressed as follows: although 
psychical acts of sensation are characterized by the immanence of a phe-
nomenal content, this is not the final point of relation of the acts, because 
the content leads, further on, to the physical cause for which it stands. This 
clarification of the character of signs of physical phenomena, as pheno-
mena pointing to the physical causes that produce them, leads from the 
correlation sensory act−physical phenomenon as an immanent object to the 
correlation physical phenomenon−physical cause as an extra-mental object 
symbolized through it (Ebd., 88 f., 19). In this way, it becomes clear how 
the analysis of the status of physical phenomena in Brentanian psychology 
leads from an instance of IT1 to an instance of IT2, and also how IT1 can 
be considered as a fragmentary or partial IT2; or, conversely, how an IT2 
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can be considered to be the IT1 that was developed and thoroughly clarified 
– in 1874 –, at least at the level of sensory acts.
The above shows that while the primary object of relation of the act 
of sensation is the immanent object, it is still the case that the 1874 Bren-
tanian IT1 does not confront the difficulty of transcending the world of 
consciousness and of coming into contact with objects in the world.15 In the 
framework of Brentanian psychology, this problem is posed on two levels: 
that of the perception of the common person and that of the perception of 
the scientist. The common person does not face such a problem because she 
or he is dealing from the start with objects in the world and considers the 
proprieties of things to exist as they appear to her (Brentano (1995a), 93). 
Neither does the scientist face the above-mentioned problem, because she 
or he distinguishes from the start between the physical phenomenon and 
its cause and knows that phenomena abide by the same laws as their causes 
(Ebd., 19, 98 f.; Brentano (1995b), 92 ff.).
 In conclusion, from what has been stated thus far, it can be seen 
that the clear and explicit distinction between psychical and physical phe-
nomena implies a distinction between the immanent object of the act of 
sensation (the sensory quality, the physical phenomenon) and the physical 
force or the object for which it stands. For this reason, we can say that a 
distinction between the content of the act and its extra-mental object was 
made in the 1874 Psychology at least at the level of the act of sensation.
3. The distinction psychical act–content–extra-mental object in the 
Logic Lecture and the IT2
In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, the problem of nominal presen-
tation is not dealt with in enough detail to resolve the problem of the rela-
tionship between content and extra-mental object. However, the lectures 
on deductive and inductive logic given by Brentano at Würzburg Universi-
ty in 1869 show that the distinction implied in his analysis of sensation in 
the 1874 work, i.e. the distinction between content and extra-mental object, 
is clearly made five years before the publication of his Psychology. In one of 
these lectures, Brentano says that: 
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The name designates in a way the content of a presentation as such, that is, 
the immanent object; in another way it designates that which is presented by 
the content of a presentation. The former is the meaning of the name. The 
latter is what the name names. About this we say the name belongs to it. It 
is that which is the external object of the presentation, if it exists. We name 
by means of the meaning.16 (EL 80.13.018) 
The quoted passage clearly shows that when the context demanded it, 
Brentano knew how to make a clear distinction between the psychical act, 
the immanent object or its content, and the extra-mental object presen-
ted through this content. According to this text, the extra-mental object is 
presented through the content or immanent object of the act. As a conse-
quence, the act of nominal presentation is related to the extra-mental object 
through signification, as its content, as the act of sensory presentation is 
related to the physical object whose action upon the sense organs gives 
rise to its apparition in consciousness, precisely through its phenomenal 
content. In both cases, the act of presentation is related to the extra-mental 
object via the immanent object or the content presenting the extra-mental 
object for which it stands.
At this point, we see again how one can go from a theory of intentiona-
lity as a theory of distinctions between psychical and physical phenomena 
(IT1) to a theory of intentionality as a theory of relating mental acts to the 
extra-mental objects presented by immanent objects (IT2). The connection be-
tween them is the immanent object’s having a double status, which can 
there fore be interpreted from the perspective of both theories: IT1 ap-
proaches it as content of the psychical act and sets out to establish a dis-
tinction between psychical and physical phenomena considered as objects 
immanent to such acts,17 and not as extra-mental physical objects. In turn, 
IT2 interprets the immanent object either as a sign of a physical object, as a 
cause (the case of sensation), or as a meaning which presents extra-mental 
objects (the case of nominal presentation). IT2 thus relates psychical acts to 
extra-mental objects via immanent objects. As I have argued, IT2 explicitly 
clarifies the relation between the immanent object and the extra-mental 
object correlated to it, a relation implicitly presupposed by IT1.18 The main 
goal of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint was not, however, to cla-
rify this relation, but to make obvious the distinctive features separating 
the two classes of phenomena, both present in consciousness. The section 
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quoted from the lectures on logic maintains the same perspective, which 
centres on the psychical act from the IP. Here, even more than in his 1874 
Psychology, Brentano sheds light on these distinctions, starting from the 
act and from its relation to the object (the relation to the immanent object 
and the extra-mental object); yet he places less emphasis on the relation 
between meaning, as an immanent object in consciousness, and the object 
presented to consciousness.19
The text cited clearly shows how Brentano distinguished, in the logic 
lectures, between the nominal presentation qua act, between the significa-
tion qua content or immanent object, and the object presented through the 
immanent object. As a consequence, Brentano offers here a characteriza-
tion of presentation that explains from the outset how psychical acts, with 
their contents, relate to extra-mental objects; something that constitutes 
an IT2. As I have shown, the distinctions involved in this model of inten-
tionality can also be seen in the way Brentano treats sensations in the 1874 
work, on the condition that we read his work devoted to this problem from 
the perspective of the distinction act–immanent object–object presented 
through this object, and not only that of act–immanent object. 
If we now consider the quote in the logic lectures from the perspective 
of the IP, it must be concluded that from the distinctions clearly traced in 
this text only the distinction between the psychical act and its content is im-
portant – this not being a physical phenomenon anymore, but a meaning. 
As a consequence, according to the IP the question we should take up is the 
following: what are the features distinguishing the psychical act of nominal 
presentation from its meaning as an immanent object, and not how does 
this act relate to the object presented through its content? If we take into 
account the fact that the immanent object presents the extra-mental object, 
it can be observed that the elements involved in the first question, the act 
and the immanent object, are sufficient for addressing the second. This, 
however, demands, on the one hand, a change in focus and, on the other, a 
consideration of the immanent object not only as a content of the act, but 
also as an object presenting an extra-mental object.
Although the distinction between the psychical act, the immanent ob-
ject, and the object presented through the immanent object, was extremely 
important for Brentano’s students and the philosophy of the 20th century in 
general, this is not the distinction that Brentano was attempting to evince 
or clarify in the IP. Rather, he was concerned with the distinction be tween 
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psychical and physical phenomena. As I have observed, achieving this dis-
tinction was of paramount importance for his psychology because (i) it 
allowed the separation of the psychical from the physical; (ii) it allowed 
psychology to aspire to the status that natural sciences had already reached, 
the status of an empirical science; and (iii) it thus contributed to the estab-
lishment of a new philosophy guided by theoretical interest and using a 
method in accordance with the nature of phenomena.20 This last point is 
especially significant because it shows how the program of the 1874 Psycho-
logy is connected to the intentional relation and how Brentano’s program 
led him to accord special weight to the analysis of physical phenomena and 
their features. In addition, the same feature of intentionality allowed for 
the separation of the main classes of psychical phenomena – something 
that constituted another major task of his psychology. Moreover, if we con-
sider the way in which the distinction between the content and the object 
of presentation was achieved in the Brentano School, namely through the 
writings of Meinong, Höfler, and especially Twardowski, it was surely the 
distinction between the act and its immanent object offered in the 1874 
Psychology that made possible the distinction between the content and the 
extra-mental object almost 20 years later on the part of his students.21 In 
any case, as we have seen, this distinction only makes explicit a relationship 
already present at the level of sensory acts in the 1874 Psychology and ap-
proached as such in the 1869/70 logic lectures.
The last argument that I wish to make in favour of this idea is the fol-
lowing: In the first chapter of his 1874 work, Brentano seems to think that 
the empirical psychology he set out to establish can found the practical dis-
ciplines of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. The distinction he achieves between 
the act and the immanent object – mainly as a distinction between psychical 
and physical phenomena – constitutes such a foundation, which was to be 
harnessed by the disciplines in question. This understanding means that 
one possible explanation for his very brief confrontation of the problem of 
nominal presentation in 1874 is that its treatment was reserved for a science, 
the logic, which empirical psychology was supposed to found only later. 
But in order to do this, empirical psychology must be itself  founded upon 
the task of achieving a distinction between its research domain – the world 
of psychical phenomena – and the research domain of natural  sciences – 
the world of physical phenomena. Seeing things from this perspective, we 
can conclude that nominal presentation could be approached only after 
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achiev ing this primary distinction. From my point of view, this suggests 
that analysis of the problem of intentionality in the 1874 work must take 
into account the program and the goals of this work as formulated by Bren-
tano at the time he was writing.22
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Notes
1 Brentano, F., (1874a), Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Leipzig: 
Duncker & Humblot, 115 f. / Brentano, F., (1995a). Psychology from an Empiri-
cal Standpoint. Eds. Kraus, O. and L. McAlister, L., trans. Rancurello, A. C. et 
al. London: Routledge (all parenthetical page numbers refer to this edition). In 
this edition the expressions “die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt” and “die Beziehung 
zum Objekt” were translated as “reference to a content” and “reference to an ob-
ject”. Despite this, in what follows I shall adhere to the way in which B. Müller 
translates the expression “die Beziehung,” and I shall consistently replace the 
above-mentioned translations with “relation to a content” and “relation to an 
object” (see Brentano, F., (1982/1995b), Descriptive Psychology. Ed. and trans. 
Müller, B. London: Routledge, 23 ff. et passim). 
2 In the EL 80 Logik manuscript, used by Brentano as a text for the Deduktive 
und Induktive Logik lecture during the winter semester 1869/70 (and recently 
made accessible on the internet by Robin Rollinger), Brentano characterizes 
and separates the main classes of psychological phenomena strictly on the basis 
of their relationship with the immanent object, without in any way referring 
to the intentional inexistence of their object: “1. All psychological phenom-
ena have in common a relation to a content. This distinguishes them from any 
other phenomenon. 2. This relation to a content is a diverse one. According to 
its main features, three classes of psychical phenomena can be distinguished: 
presenting (where something always appears), judging (where something is per-
manently accepted or rejected, affirmed or denied), loving or hating …” (“1. Alle 
psychischen Phänomene haben gemeinsam eine Beziehung auf einen Inhalt. 
Das ist, was sie von jedem anderen unterscheidet. 2. Diese Beziehung auf den 
Inhalt ist eine mehrfache. Nach den Hauptverschiedenheiten lassen sich drei 
Hauptklassen von psychischen Phänomenen unterscheiden: Vorstellen (wo im-
mer etwas erscheint), Urteilen (wo immer etwas anerkannt oder verworfen, 
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bejaht oder verneint wird), Lieben oder Hassen ….)” (Brentano, F. Logik (Spring 
2011 edition). Rollinger, R. (ed.) URL = <http://gandalf.uib.no/Brentano/
texts/el/logik/norm/> (henceforth EL80); EL80. 13.003). This shows us 
that the work, due to which the problem of intentionality was reintroduced 
into contemporary philosophy, is not that in which Brentano first defined psy-
chical phenomena on the basis of their relation to a content. In light of his 
manuscripts, newly accessible to us, it can be said that this had already been 
achieved around 1870, in the manuscript of the lectures on deductive and in-
ductive logic, for instance. This fact, however, does not exclude the possibility 
that this idea appeared in another, earlier manuscript of his lectures. At any 
rate, it is important to mention that both in the aforementioned logic lectures, 
as well as in the Psychology of 1874, the context in which he treats psychical 
phenomena played a decisive role in establishing the perspective from which 
he approached the relation to a content. In the logic lectures, Brentano is inter-
ested in the separation of the main classes of psychical phenomena: presenta-
tions, judgements, and emotional phenomena, because the first two classes of 
phenomena are extremely important for the logical investigations, especially 
for the idea that judging is a type of intentional relation fundamentally differ-
ent from presenting (EL80.13.004). On the other hand, in the 1874 work, this 
issue, while important, constitutes only a subsequent stage of his psychologi-
cal research, chiefly occupied with separating its research domain – the world 
of psychical phenomena – from the research domain of natural science – the 
world of physical phenomena. For this purpose, Brentano will not only refer 
to the relation to a content, as he does in the lectures on logic, but will also 
discuss the features of the object contained by the psychical act. If we take into 
consideration the fact that physical phenomena are contents or immanent ob-
jects existing intentionally and phenomenally in psychical acts, then by bring-
ing into discussion the relation between psychical acts and immanent objects, 
we explicitly name the two poles: psychical and physical phenomena – the 
explicit distinguishing of which is one of the major tasks of empirical psychol-
ogy (see infra).
3 I shall not go into detail about this problem here. I only mention that Bren-
tano believed that German Idealism constituted the last phase of philosophi-
cal decay in the modern era and considered himself a regenerator philosophiae. 
His goal was to contribute to the inauguration of a new era of philosophical 
rebirth, an era characterized by the dominance of theoretical interest and by us-
ing a method conforming to the nature of phenomena. If we take into account 
the fact that psychology was one of the fundamental disciplines of this philoso-
phy, we can distinguish two layers – the significance of which is revealed by 
the Brentanian gesture of separating psychical phenomena from physical phe-
nomena on the basis of intentionality: the division of the world of phenomena 
on the basis of intentionality first of all contributes to the establishment of 
empirical psychology because it delimits its research domain and, further, con-
stitutes the fundamental criterion for separating the main classes of psychical 
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phenomena. Through this, it contributes simultaneously to the establishment 
of a new philosophy put forward by Brentano, because psychology is one of 
the fundamental disciplines through which the program of this philosophy is 
achieved. The following passage from Ms. H 45: ‘Gesch. d. Phil. Einteilung 
der Wissenschaften’ (n. 25253) shows this clearly: “I. Übernatürliche Wissen-
schaft II. Natürliche Wissenschaft (einseitige Unabhängigkeit) 1. abstrakte 
Wissenschaft 1) Mathematik 2) Philosophie im weiteren Sinn a) physische 
Wissenschaft b) psychische Wissenschaft (philosophische Wissenschaften im 
engeren Sinn) 2. Konkrete Wissenschaft” (apud Hedwig (1987), XIII; about 
this problem, see Brentano (1869); Brentano (1895); Werle (1989); Hedwig 
(1987) and Tănăsescu (2011)). It is worth noting that contemporary philoso-
phers are especially interested in the problem of intentionality in Brentano and 
neglect, to a great extent, his reflections about the evolution of philosophy over 
wider historical periods, as well as the role assigned to psychology in achieving 
the philosophical program he put forward.
4 Both Twardowski’s paper On the Content and Object of Presentations (1894/1977) 
and Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900–01/2001) offer theories of inten-
tionality in this sense.
5 See Brentano (1977).
6 For this reason, P. Simons talks in his introduction to the second English edi-
tion of Brentano’s Psychology about the methodological phenomenalism adopt-
ed by Brentano in this work (Simons (1995), XVI). This idea is also taken over 
and developed by T. Crane, who emphasizes both the distinction between the 
physical phenomenon and the reality to which it refers, and the fact that physi-
cal phenomena constitute the object of study of the science of nature (Crane 
(2006), 25 ff.). It must be added that this “phenomenalistic” vision of science 
(Brentano (1995a), 14, 72) does not focus on the problem of the real or un-
real existence of the physical phenomenon, but primarily on the correlations 
between phenomena and the laws governing these correlations (Ebd., 98 ff.). 
Brentano, under the influence of Comte, had already defined the establishment 
of the laws of succession and co-existence of phenomena as the main task of 
science, an idea used as such in his 1874 work (see on this problem Brentano 
(1869), 105, 111, 114 f.; Brentano (1995a), 99; and Tănăsescu (2011)). 
7 Husserl, who explicitly elaborated an IT2, paid much less attention than Bren-
tano to intentionality as a feature separating mental from physical phenomena 
(see Vth Logical Investigation, §§9–11, and the Appendix “External and internal 
perception: physical and psychical phenomena” of the same work).
8 Twardowski refers to the ambiguity of the term ‘Vorgestellt’ (‘presented’) 
(Twardowski (1977), 11–17).
9 This is the only sentence in the IP justifying the interpretation of Brentanian 
intentionality from the perspective of the problem of the way in which con-
sciousness relates to non-existent entities, customary for authors preoccupied 
with the philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition (see on this topic Crane’s 
remarks in Crane (2006), 21 ff.; see also Chisholm (1967), who discusses from 
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the start the problem of intentionality in Brentano from the perspective of the 
orientation of acts “upon objects that do not exist” (Chisholm (1967), 7). The 
thesis of this study, however, is that the IP answers another problem, namely: 
what is the most salient distinguishing feature separating physical phenomena 
from psychical phenomena?
10 Brentano (1874b), 85 –100, 156 f.; Brentano (1895a), 23 f. 
11 Comte (1830), 86 ff., 96 f., 111 ff.
12 Comte (1838), 610 ff.
13 Brentano (1869), 104 f.; see also 110 f.
14 For scientific research it is important that the correlations between the con-
tents of sensations adequately express the correlations between the physical 
forces they present and that can be translated using the mathematical language 
of the science of nature. The relations between the two are described by Bren-
tano as follows: the sensible world is spatially three dimensional and tempo-
rally unidimensional, while the world of physical forces that produces it is 
spatially and temporally analogous to it (Brentano (1995a), 98 ff.). Brentano 
believes that we cannot and do not need to go beyond these analogies, since it 
is in the spirit of modern science theorized by Comte and adopted by him to 
stop looking for the final causes of phenomena, and instead to concentrate on 
studying their correlations (Brentano (1869), 114 f.).
15 For B. Smith and D.W. Smith (1995), 14) the theories of intentionality of the 
sort offered by Brentano in the IP face such difficulties. 
16 “Der Name bezeichnet in gewisser Weise den Inhalt einer Vorstellung als sol-
cher, den immanenten Gegenstand. In gewisser Weise das, was durch den Inhalt 
einer Vorstellung vorgestellt wird. Der erste ist die Bedeutung des Namens. Das 
zweite ist das, was der Name nennt. Von ihm sagen wir, es komme der Name 
ihm zu. Es ist das, was, wenn es existiert, äußerer Gegenstand der Vorstellung 
ist. Man nennt unter Vermittlung der Bedeutung.”
17 Because of the theoretical framework in which Brentano establishes his em-
pirical psychology, that of the distinction between the science of nature and the 
science of psychology, in the IP and in general in the 1874 work only the prob-
lem of the distinction between the psychical phenomenon and its immanent 
object (understood qua physical phenomenon and not qua abstract content, 
e.g., concept) is discussed.
18 Seeing things from this point of view, we can say that the theory put forward 
by Twardowski in his work on the content and object of presentation consti-
tutes a theory of the connections between the act, the content, and the object 
explicating the relationship between the content and the extra-mental object – 
as yet unclarified in Brentano’s 1874 work. On the other hand, Husserl’s reply 
to Brentano’s IT1, namely the theory of intentional experience from his 5th 
Logical Investigation, is an IT2 theory that sheds doubt on the very principles of 
Brentano’s empirical psychology: the evident character of inner perception and 
the distinction between a psychical phenomenon and a physical phenomenon.
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19 Brentano takes up this last problem only in Chapter VII of the 1869/70 lec-
ture “Einteilung des Begriffe und Namen,” and what he says here confirms 
what we have been said about the orientation of his analysis towards evincing 
the characteristics of the act: when he discusses the relation of the act to the 
content, Brentano designates the immanent object through the term Bedeutung 
(meaning) (see the EL80 passage quoted above); however, when he goes on 
to discuss the relation between content as an immanent object referred to by 
the expression, and the objects presented by it, he replaces the term “mean-
ing” with “concept” (Begriff) (EL80.13.018, 13.024). We shall not go into the 
details of this issue here, but it is worth mentioning that in EL80, just as in the 
dissertation, Brentano seems to think that the universal (species, genus, etc.) 
does not exist as such in reality, but only in the mind. What exists in reality is 
not the universal as such, but things presented by it (EL80.13.025; Brentano 
(1975), 159). 
20 See n. 3 above.
21 Although the thesis of this study is that the distinction immanent object (con-
tent of presentation)–object presented through it is implicitly present in the 
account of sensation given in the 1874 Psychology and explicitly in the lectures 
from 1869/70, I shall not defend the thesis that this distinction dampens the 
importance of the distinction between the content and the object of presenta-
tion explicitly made by Twardowski, twenty years later. The arguments I of-
fer in favour of this idea are the following: the distinction between the object 
and the content of presentation from the logic lectures is only one distinction 
among many others made by Brentano in this work. It is used, in particular, 
by Brentano, for the names of real things; although he also approaches the 
problem of fictional names, for instance Jupiter, and suggests that the distinc-
tion in question also applies to them, the clarification of this problem does not 
constitute, however, a capital distinction in his logic (EL80.13.009, 13.012 ff.). 
Twardowski’s work, on the other hand, is, from its very beginning, an IT2 
established on the foundations of the Brentanian IT1 (Twardowski (1977), 1). 
It is devoted only to the distinction between the content and the object of pres-
entation and regularly attempts to demonstrate that the distinction in question 
functions not only in relation to common language, an idea otherwise easy to 
accept, but also in relation to objectless presentations, such as the presentation 
of the negation of any object, for instance nothing, or in relation to impossi-
ble presentations, for instance the round square presentation, or to imaginary 
presentations, such as those like golden mountain or beings like Jupiter and 
centaurs (Ebd., 18. f). Second, we should point out that around 1904, when 
Brentano explicitly confronted the problem of the clarification of the status of 
immanent objects, he regularly eliminated these entities (universals, negations, 
privations, etc.) and preferred the reistic solution according to which only real 
things exist and can be presented (I shall not go into an analysis of the reistic 
issues here, one of the major topics of Brentanian scholarship in the last half 
of the past century (on this problem see Brentano (1977), as well as the editor’s 
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introduction to this work; see also Kamitz (1983), 175–185, Chrudzimski and 
Smith (2004)). 
22 This work was supported by a grant from the Romanian National Author-
ity for Scientific Research, CNCS-UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-
PCE-2011-3-0661, and was translated into English by Marius Dumitru.
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